|Metaphysics: is a theory that has the claim to ask questions and provide answers beyond our available knowledge. It is objected that even for asking questions, a knowledge of the meanings of the words used is required. This knowledge is not given when experiences or at least theories using these terms are not available. See also essentialism, metaphysical possibility.|
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|Holz I 13
Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: the inner unity of his work can only be understood from metaphysics.
His position lies between Kant and Hegel: he shows LeibnizVsKant the alternative of metaphysics as a science, by showing his method.
LeibnizVsHegel: he shows the possibility of metaphysics, which is not based on an absolutely idealistic way.
Holz I 24
Metaphysics/Holz: with Leibniz, it receives the scientific theory form of a non-empirically verifiable theory of the general connexion of the world. They are no longer "ideas" of the whole, but trans-empirical construction of the most plausible and most explanatory form.
Holz I 81
Metaphysics/Leibniz: since that looks like a circle, Descartes, for example, sought a justification in God.
But metaphysically, the circle cannot be dissolved, for metaphysics rests precisely on an unbroken link!
The circle is also preserved logically.
The system has to be interrupted somewhere:
Solution/Leibniz: an ineluctable function of sensory perception - not as a "first reason," but as an extra-logical material beginning of the reflexion ratio, as a quasi "Archimedean point" (outside).
Leibniz is well aware of this break.
For its part, the metaphysical necessity can no longer be deduced from reasons.
Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: in the realm of reasons of truths (for example, mathematics) the reduction is real possible to the identity principle.
Holz I 119
Leibniz thesis: the structural character of the monad causes that something is happening. The structure guarantees the unity of being and is the being of unity.
Metaphysics/Unity/World/Ultimate Establishment/Leibniz: the concept of the individual is a world concept. For this reason, the inner-world scientific justification given to the particular in its particularity is dependent on a metaphysical (underlying) principle which makes the being of the world intelligible.
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992