|Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation.|
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|Holz I 39
Identity/Leibniz: Identity A = A is an implicit principle of reason. It is presupposed in every proof. The principle itself is unprovable.
Holz I 42
Identity Principle/knowledge/Leibniz: in order that the identity principle is not only heuristic, it must be founded differently:
By the recourse to immediate sensory perception.
"making insight" = "let show" = "show" (faire voir). With Leibniz, this is the generic term for all argumentation.
Identity Principle/Leibniz: is not derived from the senses, but is set with the senses.
Definition identity principle/Leibniz: is to be compressed in the identical proposition that all possible predicates of a subject are contained in the subject, that is, each individual fact appears adequately justified if it can be represented as a predicate enclosed in the subject world.
Holz I 62
Identity Principle/Objective knowledge/Leibniz: The objective unity of the world can also be shown independently of my perception, it is evident in the given manner of every consciousness content in itself. (Everything appears as what it appears).
Adequacy does not matter.
"Tantum est quantum est, tale est quale est". Pre-predicative being a priori.
Problem: then the phenomena are still mere moments of the one and only substance, as in Spinoza.
Substance/Spinoza: no being is to be justified against the universe in its own being. Rather, the reduction of identical sentences would lead to an "ens absolute infinitum" in Spinoza, what follows is that "there is only one substance and that it is infinite".
However, this reduction can only come to a beginning without renouncing the substantial existence of the many individuals.
Holz I 131
Identity/Leibniz: Identity with itself is not an appearance, but it is, since it is a real other than matter, a real other that of which it is - origin of the appearance of substantiality: matter is not substance.
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992