|Appearance, Philosophy: Apart from logical insights we receive all our insights through our senses. Therefore, it is believed that this knowledge is not only fundamentally fallible, but is more or less pre-structured by the nature of the sense organs. This structure is not necessarily so in the world outside the perceiving subjects. Because of the linguistic prestructuring of our approach to ourselves the inner life of the subjects is also not unfailingly recognizable. See also appearance, truth, certainty, knowledge, epistemology, introspection, incorrigibility._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Holz I 128
In itself/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: their relationship with Leibniz is a dialectical one. It again corresponds exactly to the scheme of the "Overlapping General":
The in-itself is the genre of itself (!), The in-itself, and its opposite, of the phenomenon. See also "the overarching general".
This does not mean the fact that the phenomenon is always the appearance of an in-itself (which is the meaning of the word).
KantVsLeibniz: for then the phenomenon could still be different from that whose appearance it is, and hence no knowledge of the object is possible. (This is how Kant sees the relationship).
LeibnizVsKant: insists that the phenomenon is the same as the in-itself, which manifests itself in the phenomenon.
The world does this in perception. This it how it duplicates itself in two respects.
1. As a whole, however, from a different perspective
2. It appears spatially as the dissociation of the various substances,
3. It appears as a temporal succession of different perceptions.
The system of perceptions is "well-founded," because it is nothing but the self-restraining activity of the original power of the in-itself.
The difference between the in-itself and the appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and principle of its difference.
Hence the phenomenon is not standing out from the in-itself, but a kind of the same, and as such something quite real.
Appearance/world/Leibniz: the world always appears only insofar as it is expressed as being-such of a single monad.
Phenomenality/Leibniz: the way in which the thing-to-be-expressed is contained in the expressed. Every expression is a phenomenon. It is well founded because, the in-itself, the phenomenon is identical with it and establishes it as a appearing in-itself.
The phenomenon is not opposed to reality (VsKant), but precisely its specific mode of being in the process of universal representation.
Therefore, all perceptions in all individual substances must correspond to one another.
Unity/Leibniz: only in this way can all the different monads perceive one and the same appearance.
This is the "harmony universal" (universal harmony, see above) in process form, in which all appearances are linked, because they are appearances of the same in-itself.
Phenomenon/Representation/Leibniz: that means, however, that all beings are phenomenal. (Just as it is at the same time in-itself).
Since representation with Leibniz is a universal and general process, every being must be a phenomenon for every other being._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992