Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Holz I 41
Thinking/Leibniz: the contents are ultimately determined by definitions and axioms.
Holz I 69
Thinking/Leibniz: means to think of relationships and connections.
Definition "Golden Chain" of the connections/Holz: metaphor of the baroque. "Aura catena": if one is defined by its relation to another, then the totality of the elements is the reason of this one.
Chain/Leibniz: more than temporal: one is respectively more determined by its closer neighbor.
Sufficient reason/Leibniz: something can be adequately substantiated by its connection with its nearest neighbor, but not completely.
I 70
Complete justification/reason/determination/Leibniz: is only possible through the whole chain. (Infinite, only to be seen by God).
The individual terms would have to be given by identical sentences.
Holz I 77
Unity/multiplicity/Leibniz: now the multiplicity of the world (manifoldness of perceptions) is given empirically.
Axiom: Variety principle: "I perceive different things" (varia a me percipiuntur). This is undoubtedly by direct intuition. This is not provable as empiricism, but it is also not a burden of proof, since it is directly given. (> Given).
From this it follows that if the being of the world as a whole is necessary, "every contingent is necessary in a certain way."
Holz: necessity is thus overlapping over contingency.
I 78
Principle of Variety/Principles/Thinking/Leibniz: the formal principle of thinking is based on the principle of variety.
((s) Because you cannot think of a single thing without relation to anything else.)
Double movement/ascent/descent/Leibniz/Holz: from the certainty of the perceived multiplicity, one can now ascend to the infinitesimal boundary concept "all beings at the same time".

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-30