Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Relevance: is the importance of previously identified aspects of an object, action or situation against other aspects in relation to a description or assessment. See also relevance logic._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Stephen Leeds on Relevance - Dictionary of Arguments
I 381f Relevance/ambiguity/role/explanation/truth/leads: but the ambiguity of the truth predicate T does not show that T does not play a crucial role. - It only shows that other truth-like relations are equally important. Analogy to metrics: that one can set up physics in non-standard spacetime does not show that explanations making use of metrics would not be explanations. Explanation/LeedsVs: this is a bad analogy: the reason physicists prefer a particular explanation is that there is a well-understood sense here in which competing explanations can be considered essentially equivalent. >Explanations. Incorrect explanation: "Most of the propositions of our theory are T": this is quite empty: suppose the theory is consistent and incomplete. Then it would follow that it comes out as "true" under various incompatible W predicates. "Success" would then be to accept any of the W predicates. - If we already accept atomic physics, we don't need a W theory to explain why atomic physics works. >Truth theory, >Truth predicate, >Circular reasoning. Solution/Leeds: the correct explanandum is not that some theories work, but that we (happen to?) have some theories that work. N.B.:T could become important after all: only after T it would not be a coincidence. I 384 Wrong: Truth then to be defined in terms of our method. >Definition, >Definability. LeedsVsKant: That would be like his Copernican turn: we could change our scheme arbitrarily. Problem: 1) then we could no longer say that our induction could also harm us- 2) we could no longer say that our theories are successful because they are true. >Reference systems, >Conceptual schemes._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16