|Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.|
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Stephen Leeds on Reference - Dictionary of Arguments
Reference/Leeds: is no longer defined in terms of translation, because one cannot say in theoretical terms:
(Ey) (N refers to y)
Whereby N is a foreign-language word.
Problem: the existence of y is not secured.
Today: Causal theories.
Problem: Numbers are probably not referring - hence there is probably no reference definition for any language possible.
Problem: if reference is undefined ("B" or "C"), from a foreign-language expression, then "A" veut dire A" is just as ambiguous! - Then there are several reference schemes defined by a single Tarskian reference sentence - We cannot say that a foreign language has no standard interpretation by invoking the indeterminacy of the translation.
Standard interpretation: must not be given, even if ""Caesar" has the relation R to Caesar" is trivially true by determination._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
"Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994