Dictionary of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth.

_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Field II 162
Leeds/linguistic perspective/LeedsVsChurch/meaning/extension/Field (Leeds 1979) : - literal meaning / Leeds : e.g. the German word "bedeutet" literally means not the same as the English " means" : it does not even have the same extension - N.B. " bedeutet" refers "dog " to " Hund" and "Hund" to "Hund" , but not to "dog".
"Means ": maps "dog" on "dog" and "Hund" on "dog" but not to "dog"
but "bedeeutet" and "means" nevertheless stand in a homology relation:

Homology/Meaning/Field: Example The following two predicates are extensional different :
 a) "The temperature in Fahrenheit of x r"
 b ) "The temperature in Celsius of x r".
Solution : this homology makes it sensible to translate "means dog" as "means dog" - Leeds: the literal meaning is not important! We can not even get it.
Field ditto.
DummettVsChurch: that undermines his argument.


_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Leeds I
Stephen Leeds
"Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994


Send Link
> Counter arguments against Leeds
> Counter arguments in relation to Meaning ...

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  



Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-03-20
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration