Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
 
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Pagel I 71
Truth/Lacan: is guaranteed from elsewhere than from reality: from speaking. It is neither clearly comprehensible, nor knowable. We can only take note of it, as far as we are speaking to express our desires, which are never wholly satisfied, and refer to the wishes of the others.
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I, 119f
Speech/Lacan: no longer dual I-you-relationship, but place for a third: the big other large-A.
Silence: condition for "full speech".
Original speaking: where the language still asks and does not answer objectively yet.
Speaking/Lacan: "The other is the place where in the connection with what hears, the I, which speaks, is constituted; and what he says one is already an answer, whereby the other deciding via his hearing whether he spoke or not."
To not allow oneself to be disturbed by the accents which the ego (moi) sets, but to perceive the appeal of the (great) other great-A beyond the (small) other small a.
Truth: lies neither on the side of one nor on the other, but certainly "between" the speakers.

Lacan I
Gerda Pagel
Jacques Lacan zur Einf├╝hrung Hamburg 1989


> Counter arguments against Lacan
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-26