Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory. The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability. A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence. B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas. C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Pagel I 71
Truth/Lacan: is guaranteed from elsewhere than from reality: from speaking. It is neither clearly comprehensible, nor knowable. We can only take note of it, as far as we are speaking to express our desires, which are never wholly satisfied, and refer to the wishes of the others.
I, 119f
Speech/Lacan: no longer dual I-you-relationship, but place for a third: the big other large-A.
Silence: condition for "full speech".
Original speaking: where the language still asks and does not answer objectively yet.
Speaking/Lacan: "The other is the place where in the connection with what hears, the I, which speaks, is constituted; and what he says one is already an answer, whereby the other deciding via his hearing whether he spoke or not."
To not allow oneself to be disturbed by the accents which the ego (moi) sets, but to perceive the appeal of the (great) other great-A beyond the (small) other small a.
Truth: lies neither on the side of one nor on the other, but certainly "between" the speakers.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Lacan I
Gerda Pagel
Jacques Lacan zur Einführung Hamburg 1989

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-07-22