|Imagination, philosophy: imaginations are mental representations of non-present situations, events, states, sensory perceptions, experiences with certain characteristics, tones, sound sequences, sounds, noises, voices, smells, heat, coldness etc. The imagination of something undefined is not possible. Understanding a sentence can create an idea of the corresponding situation or image. See also representations past, future, mental states._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Pylyshyn: Problem: internal knowledge representation. Vs Visual ideas as a qualitatively independent or theoretically adequate form of mental representation.
Imagination, visual/Kosslyn: Question: do they differ from other conceptions in structure and function?
Interpretation: we are never aware of having to interpret imaginary images.
There are no incomplete ideas, for example that half a sofa is missing.
But too much storage capacity would be necessary to store all the information from the retina.
Besides, there would be no practical access if all of them were stored.
So there must be some interpretation.
Pictorial ideas are never necessarily true. (In contrast to some propositions).
Imagination/visual/Kosslyn: mere having does not imply that there is a causal role here.
Thesis: Our perception consists of parts assigned to objects.
KosslynVsPylyshyn: we do have imaginary images. Even if they are not scanned internally.
If the images are saved uninterpreted, you do not need too much time to access them.
Imagination/visual imagination/image/picture/Kosslyn/Pomerantz: Interpretation: we are never aware of the need to interpret mental images. There are no incomplete ideas about e.g. that the half of a sofa is lacking. There would be no practical access, if all imaginations were saved. So there must be some interpretation.
Pylyshyn Thesis: there must be a third code between language and visual presentation - problem: that is uneconomical.
Stephen M. Kosslyn/James R. Pomerantz, Imagery, Propositions and the Form of Internal Representations”, Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Stephen M. Kosslyn
James R. Pomerantz
"Imagery, Propositions, and the Form of Internal Representations", in: Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992