Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Cresswell II 154
Making rigid/description/Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1977, 259f):
Normal description/Logical Form/Cresswell: "The F is G" is true in any possible world w iff. the thing that is (unambiguously) F in w is also G in w.
Rigid description/logical form: here is this true in w iff. the thing that is in the actual world F is G in w, whether or not it is F there in w.
Current world: which world is the actual one, is again relative to the standpoint: every world is for itself the actual one.
Rigid description/logical form: the rigid description must therefore involve two worlds: for we must say
"The F is G" is true in w2 as seen from w1, iff. the thing that is F in w1 is G in w2.
Double indexing/multiple indexing/terminology/Cresswell: it is called like this in Kamp (1971), but it is almost not quite used in Lewis (1970. 185f). Explicitly in Stalnaker (1978, 320) as the formalization of Kripke's approach about names. It seems to be accepted in Kaplan (1979).

Kamp I
From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy)

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25