|Twodimensional semantics: Twodimensional are semantics that take into account both the properties of a situation described by a statement and the properties of the utterance situation (which need not be identical with the described situation). For example, the statement that one is at location A, B or C is true when it is uttered at location A, B or C (diagonalization). Statements of a particular form are always true, e.g. "I am here now". In this case, the entire two-dimensional matrix is assigned the value "true". Two-dimensional semantics go back to D. Kaplan (D. Kaplan, Demonstratives, in Perry & Wettstein (Eds.) Themes from Kaplan, Oxford, 1989, pp. 481-563). See also context/context dependency, diagonalization, diagonal propositions, A-intensions, C-intensions, Stalnaker intensions, character, content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Books on Amazon:
Frank C. Jackson
|Stalnaker I 204
Two-dimensional framework/Jackson/Stalnaker: with the two-dimensional framework one can reduce necessity a posteriori as Jackson and Chalmers have done. This solves the problem of intentionality. (> Metaphysics).
Stalnaker: I will show the two ways to interpret this framework:
B) metasemantically._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003