Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Knowledge: Knowledge is the awareness or understanding of something. It can be acquired through experience, or education. Knowledge can be factual, procedural, or conceptual. See also Propositional knowledge, Knowledge how._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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F. Jackson on Knowledge - Dictionary of Arguments
Martine Nida-Rümelin: Was Mary nicht wusste in Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein, Paderborn, München 1995 Metzinger II 274 "Knowing how it is"/Qualia/Jackson/LewisVsJackson: Knowledge-how is no knowledge: since it does not exclude alternatives. Instead: knowledge-how is the ability to recognize something. >Knowing how. --- Nida-Rümelin II 280 Argument of incomplete knowledge/Jackson: the argument should show in the original version that there are no physical facts, i.e. such facts which cannot be formulated in physical vocabulary. >Qualia/Chalmers._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 Nida I Martine Nida-Rümelin Was Mary nicht wissen konnte. Phänomenale Zustände als Gegenstand von Überzeugungen In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16