Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

 
Supervenience, philosophy of mind: supervenience is an expression for a restricted dependency between areas. Elements of a region B are dependent on changes of elements of an area A, but not vice versa. Supervenience is used by some authors to explain the relationship between mental and physical processes. The assumption of a supervenience serves to circumvent more powerful assumptions like, e.g. the identity theory. See also covariance, dependency, identity theory, materialism, reductionism.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon:
Frank C. Jackson
Stalnaker I 106
Global Supervenience/WilliamsonVsJackson/Stalnaker: as Jackson defines global supervenience, it is not sufficient for strong supervenience.
Definition Global Supervenience/Ethics/Jackson:
For all worlds w and w' if w and w' are exactly the same descriptively, then they are also exactly the same from an ethical point of view.
((s) That is, the ethical supervenes on the descriptive.)> WilliamsonVsJackon.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003


> Counter arguments against Jackson
> Counter arguments in relation to Supervenience

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-26