﻿ Frank C. Jackson on Propositions - Dictionary of Arguments

# Dictionary of Arguments

Propositions, philosophy: propositions are defined as the meanings of sentences, whereby a sentence is interpreted as a character string, which must still be interpreted in relation to a situation or a speaker. E.g. “I am hungry” has a different meaning from the mouth of each new speaker. On the other hand, the sentence “I am hungry” from the mouth of the speaker, who first expressed the German sentence, has the same meaning as the German sentence uttered by him. See also meaning, propositional attitudes, identity conditions, opacity, utterances, sentences.

_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
Schwarz I 207 (note)
Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, i.e. by inserting as the world parameter the world of the respective situation (correspondingly the time parameter for the point of time of the situation, etc.).
Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions.
Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a, 38, 1994b, 296f).
Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1 Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the first intension is for primary truth conditions.
Definition C Intension/Secondary Intension/2 Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the second intension is for secondary truth conditions.
Definition A Proposition/1 Proposition/C Proposition/2 Propsition/Terminology/Black: this works correspondingly. (Jackson 1998a, 2004, Lewis 2002b, Chalmers 1996b, 5665)
Definition meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975,173): meaning 1 are secondary truths conditions.
Definition meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning 2 is a complex function of situations and worlds on truth value, "two-dimensional intension".
Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things:
Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: primary truth conditions are not determined in Lewis by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not over a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions.

_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

> Counter arguments against Jackson
> Counter arguments in relation to Propositions

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-21