|Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions.|
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Frank C. Jackson
|Stalnaker I 211
Name/Reference/Jackson: For example, let us assume a language that excludes the reference determination of names. It would still have the power of expressing "to say to some extent how things are"
Stalnaker: if there was such a thing, it would make sense to say that the reference determination is part of the descriptive content of names.
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003