|Intensions: intensions are reference objects resulting from a linguistic description, in contrast to the material objects (extensions) that may differ therefrom, whether due to inaccuracies, or by the use of indexical expressions. Examples of intensions are “the oldest person in the room”, “the winner”, “John's favorite quote”, “the one who violates the speed limit”. See also morning star/evening star, extensionality, extension._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Stalnaker I 16
Definition Propositional concepts/Stalnaker: propositional concepts are functions of possible worlds on truth values. When an utterance in a possible world is associated with a propositional idea, one can define with it two different propositions: A-Intension and C-Intension (Terminology by Jackson).
C: The propositional thought
X: The possible world
U: The utterance
Definition C-Intension/Jackson: is c (x), expressed by u in x. ((s) whereby the semantics in world x causes the content c to be expressed, which may differ from what can be meant in another world). So relative to the possible world.
Definition A-Intension/Jackson: the A-Intension is defined solely by the propositional idea. ((s) that what is meant.) (Independent of possible worlds)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003