|Content: content is that part of a statement, what can be represented by another statement, which differs in a respect from the original statement, e.g. it uses other expressions with the same reference. That, in which the second statement deviates belongs then to the vocabulary, to the syntax or grammar, the matching can be called content.|
Books on Amazon:
Frank C. Jackson
|Black I 171
"Naturalization of content"/representation/Schwarz: the naturalization of content is, thesis: that mental representations are so far as to be clause-like, so that one can explain their content compositionally. (See Fodor 1990).
LewisVsFodor: fundamentally missed: only the causal role in everyday life (behavior) is relevant. Even if the desire for e.g. mushroom soup is beautifully composed of desire for soup and desire for mushroom. Because on the opposite it is a mushroom soup desire, if it plays exactly this causal role, no matter what it is composed of. (1994b, 320f)
One can equally well imagine beings who do not represent clause-like (see Armstrong 1973, Chap. 1, Braddon Mitchell/Jackson 1996, chapter 10f).
Lewis's theory is also intended to be valid for these worlds, as well as to explain what determines the content.
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000
Bedeutung und Intention
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979
Sprache München 1973
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983