|Concept: term for an entity with certain properties. The properties of an object correspond to the features of the concept. These concept features are necessary in contrast to the properties of an individual object, which are always contingent._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Black I 234
Conceptual analysis/Lewis/Schwarz: While for most authors the conceptual analysis is separated from philosophy, it is connected to it for Lewis and also for Jackson.
SchwarzVs: Vs both positions: as, for example, Panprotopychism and the world as it is show, there are indeed metaphysical supervenience relations which are not associated with analytic reducibility.
N.B.: this shows that they do not deserve the philosophical status: panprotopsychism is not a real physical position, the supervenience of all truths in the "world as it is" is an irrelevant formal curiosity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000
"Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979
The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978
Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994