|Rigidity, philosophy: Rigidity is an expression for the property of names to stand for the same object in all possible worlds, as opposed to descriptions that are not rigid and can change their reference. E.g. it is pointless to ask whether Napoleon might have been someone else but Napoleon in a possible world, but it is not meaningless to say that there is a possible world in which Napoleon is not the winner of Austerlitz. See also descriptions, names, possible worlds, range, necessity, possibility, reference, semantics of possible worlds, intensions, propositions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Cross-world identity/Rigidity/HintikkaVsKripke: it is more about the way of identification (public/perspective, see above) than about rigidity or non-rigidity.
The way of identification decides what counts as one and the same individual.
HintikkaVsKripke: his concept of rigidity is implicitly founded on Russell's notion of the logical proper name. There is, however, no excellent class of rigid expression terms.
Proper names/names/HintikkaVsKripke: proper names are by no means always rigid. E.g. it may be that I do not know to whom the name N.N. refers. Then I have different epistemic alternatives, with different referents. Therefore it makes sense to ask "Who is N.N.?".
Public/Perspective/Identification/Russell/Kripke/Hintikka: Russell: Russell focuses on the perspective.
Kripke/Hintikka: on the public identification._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996