Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 7
Standard semantics/Kripke semantics/Hintikka: what differences are there? The ditch between them is much deeper than it first appears.
Cocchiarella: he has shown, however, that even in the simplest quantifying case of the monadic predicate logic, the standard logic is radically different from its Kripke cousin.
Decidability: monadic predicate logic is, as Kripke has shown, decidable.
Kripke semantics: Kripke semantics is undecidable.
Decisibility: Decisibility implies axiomatizability.
Stronger/Weaker/Hintikka: as soon as we go beyond monadic predicate logic, we have a logic of considerable strength, complexity, and unruliness.
Quantified standard modal logic 1. level/Hintikka: the quantified standard modal logic of 1. level is in a sense more powerful than 2. level logic (with standard semantics). The latter is, of course, already very strong, so that some of the most difficult unresolved logical and quantum-theoretical problems can be expressed in terms of logical truth (or fulfillment) in logical formulas of the second level.
Definition equally strong/stronger/weaker/Hintikka: (here): to show an equally difficult decision-making problem.
Decision problem: for standard logic 2. level can be reduced to that for quantified standard modal logic 1. level.
Reduction: this reduction is weaker than translatability.
I 9
Quantified standard modal logic 1. level/Hintikka: this logic is very strong, comparable in strength with 2. level logic. It follows that it is not axiomatizable. (HintikkaVsKripke).
The stronger a logic is, the less manageable it is.
I 28
Branched quantifiers/branching/stronger/weaker/Hintikka:
E.g. branching here:
1. branch: There is an x and b knows...
2. branch: b knows there is an x ...
Quantification with branched quantifiers is extremely strong, almost as strong as 2. level logic.
Therefore, it cannot be completely axiomatized. (Quantified epistemic logic with unlimited independence).
I 29
Variant: variants are simpler cases where the independence refers to ignorance, combined with a move with a single, non-negated operator {b} K. Here, an explicit treatment is possible.
I 118
Seeing/stronger/weaker/logical form/Hintikka:
a) stronger: recognizing, recognizing as, seeing as.
b) weaker: to look at, to keep a glance on, etc.
Weaker/logical form/seeing/knowing/Hintikka: E.g.
(Perspective, "Ex")
(15) (Ex) ((x = b) & (Ey) John sees that (x = y)).
(16) (Ex)(x = b & (Ey) John remembers that x = y))
(17) (Ex)(x = b & (Ey) KJohn (x = y))
Acquaintance/N.B.: in (17) b can be even John's acquaintance even if John does not know b as b! ((S) because of y).
I 123
Everyday language/ambiguity/Hintikka: the following expression is ambiguous:
(32) I see d
(33) (Ex) I see that (d = x)
That says the same as (31) if the information is visual or
(34) (Ex) (d = x & (Ey) I see that (x = y))
This is the most natural translation of (32).
Weaker: for the truth of (34) it is enough that my eyes simply rest on the object d. I do not need to recognize it as d.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

> Counter arguments against Hintikka

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-26