Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Opacity, philosophy: also opacity of the reference. A problem with propositions (meanings of uttered sentences related to a speaker) is that one cannot be certain that one knows what an utterance refers to. E.g. in an empty room is a blackboard with the inscription "I am hungry". See also intensions, propositions, propositional attitudes, reference, inscrutability, quotation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J. Hintikka on Opacity - Dictionary of Arguments
II 57 Opacity/Frege/identity/opaque context/Hintikka: Frege was involved in the failure of the (substitutability in identity) ((s) that is, that the individuals may have different names) and not in the failure of the existential generalization. ((s) That is, the individuals may not exist.) >Existential generalization, >Substitution, >Substitutability. Hintikka: therefore we need different additional premises. Semantics of possible worlds: Substitutability in identity: here, for substitutability in identity, we need only the assumption that we can compare the referents of two different terms in every world. Existential generalization: here we must compare the reference of one and the same term in all worlds. Frege/Hintikka: it seems now that Frege could still be defended in a different way: namely, that we now quantify via world lines (as entities). ((s) This would meet Frege's Platonism.) II 58 World Lines/Hintikka: world lines are somehow "real". Are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"? HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world-bound individuals and world lines as individuals. World Lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". To use world lines is not to reify. Solution/Hintikka: we need world lines because without them it would not even make sense to ask whether a resident of a possible world is the same as that of another possible world ((s) cross-world identity). II 59 World Line/Hintikka: we use the world line instead of Frege's "way of giving". HintikkaVsFrege: his mistake was to reify the "way of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual. Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, we do not have to ask in this context "about what do we have to quantify"? >Quantification. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19