Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Opacity, philosophy: also opacity of the reference. A problem with propositions (meanings of uttered sentences related to a speaker) is that one cannot be certain that one knows what an utterance refers to. E.g. in an empty room is a blackboard with the inscription "I am hungry". See also intensions, propositions, propositional attitudes, reference, inscrutability, quotation.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 57
Opacity/Frege/Identity/opaque context/Hintikka: Frege had to do with the failure of the (substitutability in identity) ((s) that is, that the individuals may have a different names), not with the failure of existential generalization. ((s) That is, the individuals may not exist).
Hintikka: therefore we need different additional premises.
Semantics of possible worlds:
Substitutability in identity: here, for substitutability in identity, we need only the assumption that we can compare the referents of two different terms in every world.
Existential generalization: here we must compare the reference of one and the same term in all worlds.
Frege/Hintikka: it seems now that Frege could still be defended in a different way: namely, that we now quantify via world lines (as entities). ((s) This would meet Frege's Platonism.)
I 58
World lines/Hintikka: world lines are somehow "real"! Are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"?
HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world-bound individuals and world lines as individuals.
World lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". To use world lines is not to reify.
Solution/Hintikka: we need world lines because without them it would not even make sense to ask whether a resident of a possible world is the same as that of another possible world ((s) cross-world identity).
I 59
World line/Hintikka: we use the world line instead of Frege's "way of giving".
HintikkaVsFrege: his mistake was to reify the "way of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual.
Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, we do not have to ask in this context "about what we quantify".

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Hin I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-25