|Description: A. Characterization of singular objects or events instead of giving a name. As opposed to names descriptions are not rigid, i.e. they may refer to different objects in different worlds. - B. Linguistic form for attributing predicates according to the perceptions of objects. See also rigidity, theory of descriptions.|
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Description/Knowledge/Russell/Hintikka: Knowledge by description: here we know propositions about the "so-and-so" without knowing who or what the "so-and-so" is.
Ad (ii): E.g. description: instead of Bismarck: "the first chancellor of the German Reich".
HintikkaVs (ii) this sweeps the problem under the carpet.
Problem: the use of descriptions must ultimately lead to the fact that the descriptions are translated back into names, and this is not possible here!
Reduction/Description/Names/Hintikka: not all individuals with descriptions we talk about have identities that are known to everyone. The interpretation of Russell does not rule out the fact that many different entities act as legitimate values of the variables, which in principle can also be named with names.
Ad (iii) Russell/Hintikka: that was Russell's implicit solution: he redefines the range of the individual variables so that they are restricted to individuals we know by acquaintance.
Existential Generalization/EG/Russell/Hintikka: the existential generalization applies only to names of individuals with whom we are familiar.
Concealed description/Russell/Hintikka: the existential generalization fails for individuals whose names have to be conceived as covert descriptions ((s) because we know them only by description).
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996