|Intentionality: intentionality is the ability of people and higher animals to relate to and react to circumstances such as things and states. Concepts, words, and sentences also refer to something but have no intentionality. This linguistic relating-to is called reference instead.|
Books on Amazon
Intentionality/Hintikka. Thesis: Intentionality has a multi-world character.
Definition intentional/Hintikka: a concept is intentional iff. its semantic explanation involves several possible scenarios and their relation to each other. This places intentionality close to intensity. Thesis: Intentionality is a gradual matter. There are types and dimensions of intentionality that are not all equally interesting. Just as possible worlds can differ.
Chisholm: Chisholm has proved intentionality in the logical behavior of certain concepts.
Definition Intentional/Intentionality/Hintikka: Thesis: it is a sign of intentionality when possible worlds are used to explain the semantics of the concept.
Intentionality/Hintikka: we can also call it intensionality:
One has to look at a background of alternatives (unrealized possibilities) when one considers the consciousness of a subject.
Intentionality/Brentano/Husserl/Hintikka: for the two, "directedness at an object" was essential for intentionality. An intentional term "points behind itself". HintikkaVsHusserl/HintikkaVsBrentano.
William Kneale: ditto. KnealeVsHusserl/KnealeVsBrentano.
Intentionality/Hintikka: intentionality is a gradual matter. This is obvious if it is true that we always have to look at unrealized possibilities when it comes to intentionality.
"Ontological Power"/Hintikka: the greater the ontological power of a mind, the more one can go beyond the actual world.
Degree of Intentionality/Hintikka: the degree of intentionality is measured by the distance to the actual world.
Intentionality/Hintikka: that the failure of (c) (preservation of identity, VsSeparation) is a criterion for them, can be seen in their behavior in changing concepts: necessity (logical, physical, and analytical) satisfy condition c). ("What is, is necessary what it is and no other thing")
Conversely, certain other concepts are obviously more intentional than necessity, and they violate c).
E.g. "Not everything what is, is so that it is known what it is, nor that it is no other thing".
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996