Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Intentionality: intentionality is the ability of people and higher animals to relate to and react to circumstances such as things and states. Concepts, words, and sentences also refer to something but have no intentionality. This linguistic relating-to is called reference instead._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J. Hintikka on Intentionality - Dictionary of Arguments
II XVII Intentionality/Hintikka: thesis: intentionality has a multi-world character. Def intentional/Hintikka: a concept is intentional iff. its semantic explanation involves several possible scenarios and their relation to each other. This places intentionality close to intensionality. >Intensionality. Thesis: intentionality is a gradual matter. There are types and dimensions of intentionality that are not all equally interesting. Just as possible worlds can differ. Chisholm/Hintikka: Chisholm has proved intentionality in the logical behavior of certain concepts. II 183 Def intentional/intentionality/Hintikka: thesis: it is a sign of intentionality when possible worlds are used to explain the semantics of the concept. >Possible worlds. Intentionality/Hintikka: we can also call it intensionality: One has to look at a background of alternatives (unrealized possibilities) when one considers the consciousness of a subject. Intentionality/Brentano/Husserl/Hintikka: for the two, "directedness at an object" was essential for intentionality. An intentional term "points behind itself". HintikkaVsHusserl/HintikkaVsBrentano. William Kneale: ditto. KnealeVsHusserl/KnealeVsBrentano. II 188 Intentionality/Hintikka: intentionality is a gradual matter. This is obvious if it is true that we always have to look at unrealized possibilities when it comes to intentionality. "Ontological Power"/Hintikka: the greater the ontological power of a mind, the more one can go beyond the actual world. Degree of Intentionality/Hintikka: the degree of intentionality is measured by the distance to the actual world. II 196 Condition c: "What is, is necessary what it is and no other thing." Intentionality/Hintikka: that the failure of (c) (preservation of identity, VsSeparation) is a criterion for them, can be seen in their behavior in changing concepts: necessity (logical, physical, and analytical) satisfies condition c). ("What is, is necessary what it is and no other thing".) Conversely, certain other concepts are obviously more intentional than necessity, and they violate c). >Logical necessity, >Analytical necessity. II 197 E.g. "Not everything what is, is so that it is known what it is, nor that it is no other thing"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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> Counter arguments against Hintikka
> Counter arguments in relation to Intentionality
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18