|Objects of belief, philosophy: it is advocated by some authors that beliefs or thoughts must correspond to objects. Other authors see this as the risk of an objectification or reification. See also relation-theory, truthmakers mentalism, reification._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Objects of knowledge/objects of belief/Frege/Hintikka: Frege was concerned about which objects we must adopt in order to understand the logical behavior of the language when it comes to knowledge.
Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege's objects of knowledge are the Fregean senses,> reified, intensional objects).
Hintikka: I am concerned first with the individuals we are talking about in epistemic contexts, and secondly, I am concerned about whether we can call them "objects of knowledge".
Semantics of possible worlds/HintikkaVsFrege: we can opppose his approach with the semantics of possible worlds. (Hintikka pro semantics of possible worlds).
Idea: Application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives).
Possible worlds/Hintikka: the expression is misleading because it is too global.
Definition scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knowing person b. We can also call it b's worlds of knowledge.
Set of all worlds/Hintikka: the set of all worlds can be called illegitimate.
Objects of knowledge/Hintikka: objects of knowledge can be objects, persons, artefacts, etc.
Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for any entities. (Frege's thesis). These can be taken as Frege's objects of knowledge.
Identity/Substitutability/Substitutability in identity/Terminology/Frege/Hintikka: Substitutability in identity is the thesis of the substitutability of the identity ((s) only applies restrictedly in intensional (opaque) contexts).
E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star
From this, one cannot infer that Ramses knew that morning star = evening star (although morning star = evening star).
Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguish two types of context:
Direct context/Frege/Hintikka: the direct context is extensional and transparent.
Indirect context/Frege/Hintikka: the indirect context is intensional and opaque. For example, contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "extensional", "opaque" etc. are not from Frege).
Frege/Hintikka: according to his picture:
(4) Expression > Meaning > Reference.
((s) I.e. according to Frege, the intension determines the extension.
Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here the picture is modified:
(5) expression (>) meaning (> reference).
Objects of knowledge/Possible Worlds Approach/HintikkaVsFrege:
Idea: Knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that compels us to consider certain possibilities. This is what we call possible world.
New: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) next to the referents, but we consider the same referents in different worlds.
Morning star/Evening Star/Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: Solution: "Morning Star" and "Evening Star" now take out the same object, namely the planet in the actual world._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996