|Domain: In model theory a set of defined objects, for which a model is satisfiable. In logic a set of objects that can be related to statements._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Jaakko Hintikka on Domains - Dictionary of Arguments
Individual domain/Possible Worlds/Montague/Hintikka: Thesis: Montague assumes a constant domain of individuals.
HintikkaVsMontague: precisely this assumption leads to problems. Especially in religious contexts.
Individual/Montague: Individuals are the domain of functions that function as the sense of a singular term.
Belief Context/opaque context/belief/propositional attitude/HintikkaVsMontague: Problem: Montague does not devote contexts with propositional attitudes a special approach (setting contexts). E.g. "knowing who", e.g. "remembering where", e.g. "seeing what". This is a defect because Montague had been interested in propositional attitudes.
Domain/variable/individual variable/quantification/Hintikka: my own approach (semantics of possible worlds) has been called "interpretation of the restricted domain".
HintikkaVs: this misunderstands the logical situation: it is about the fact that the individuals have to be well-defined for the set of worlds with which we have to deal.
N.B.: the set of worlds changes with the propositional attitudes. So the the actual world, e.g. does not have to be included!
Propositional attitudes/Hintikka/(s): different attitudes (beliefs, doubts, seeing, etc.) demand different sets of worlds.
Variables/values/Hintikka: it may be that the domain of our variables can be a superset of the set of the actual individuals (if the set of possible worlds does not contain the actual world).
E.g. it may be that someone has correct beliefs about all the actual individuals, but also mistakenly believes that there are still more individuals that he only imagines.
Hintikka: therefore my approach can be called with the same right one of the "extended domains".
Individual domain/domain/Russell/Hintikka: Russell, on the other hand, seems to have actually represented a set of the restricted domain by restricting it to objects of acquaintance.
Possible world/individual domain/HintikkaVsKripke: one should not demand that the individuals must remain the same when changing from world to world. The speech of worlds is empty if there is possible experience that could make them different.
Possible worlds/Hintikka: possible worlds should be best determined as by the connected possible totals of experience.
And then separation cannot be excluded.
Separation/Hintikka: separation is useful in a few models of cross-world identification, re-identification in time. E.g. a computer could be dismantled and two computers could be built from it. This could be revised later.
Re-identification/Hintikka: is the key to cases of separation and fusion.
Separation/Hintikka: there is a structural reason why it is so rare: if world lines are composed of infinitesimal elements as the solutions of differential equations, the separation corresponds to a singularity, and this is a rare phenomenon.
Separation/Hintikka: the arguments against them are circular in a deep sense. They are based on the idea that for quantification the individual area should remain fixed. (HintikkaVsKripke)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Merrill B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989