|Similarity metrics: a measure of similarity. It is a problem in relation to possible worlds that it is not always determinable which one of two worlds is closer in relation to a third.|
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Similarity/semantics of possible worlds/similarity metrics/Hintikka: similarity can be ascertained in two ways:
1. Ask what the maximum distance between possible worlds is.
2. Ask what the minimum distance is.
Ad 1.: the factuality condition causes the distance to be zero (minimum distance). That is, that a given world is within its own alternatives.
Intentionality/Hintikka: the failure of similarity metrics is an interesting criterion for intentionality.
E.g. knowledge, for this reason, it is less intentional than belief.
Factuality/Hintikka: the expression of factuality is misleading in the way that we can look at a lot of possible worlds, excluding the actual world! E.g. Deontology:
Deontology/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: here it could be that we exclude the actual world from the set of possible worlds. ((s) That we consider only desirable that deviate from reality).
Hintikka: the idea is that whatever is compulsory in a given world is true in each of its deontic alternatives. Because these alternatives would be deontically perfect worlds.
Deontology/Hintikka: deontology is according to this explanation non-intentional.
Phenomenology/Hintikka: the failure of the factuality condition is closely related to the ideas of phenomenology: it is decisive for the possible non-existence of an object to which a mental act is directed.
Act/Brentano/Hintikka: Thesis: the object can be "non-existent" in it.
Husserl/Hintikka: Thesis: Objects of files are judicial or otherwise propositional.
Non-existence/Intentionality/Brentano/Husserl/Hintikka: non-existence leads to a failure of factuality. Therefore the failure of factuality is an important criterion for the understanding of phenomenology.
Similarity Metrics/Similarity/Possible Worlds/Hintikka: E.g. knowledge
Knowledge/belief/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: the maximum distance between worlds allowed by knowledge is greater than the maximum distance in the case of belief.
Because knowledge entails belief, the worlds of belief are within the set of knowledge-worlds.
According to the unrevised criterion, then belief would be more intentional than knowledge.
Vs: the opposite is the case.
Logically possible/Hintikka: some logically possible worlds are wilder and further away from the actual world than worlds that one believes. Nevertheless, logical modalities are less intentional than propositional attitudes.
Problem: the measure of the maximum distance provides false results if we are dealing with different intensional terms.
Intentionality/Hintikka: that the failure of (c) (preservation of identity, VsSeparation) is a criterion for them, can be seen in their behavior of changing terms: necessity (logical, physical, and analytical) satisfy condition c). ("What is, is necessary what it is and no other thing")
Conversely, certain other concepts are obviously more intentional than necessity, and they violate c).
E.g. "Not everything that is, is so that it is known what it is, nor that it is no other thing".
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996