|Content: content is that part of a statement, what can be represented by another statement, which differs in a respect from the original statement, e.g. it uses other expressions with the same reference. That, in which the second statement deviates belongs then to the vocabulary, to the syntax or grammar, the matching can be called content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Bubner I 62
Content/Form/Generality/Hegel/Bubner: However, throughout the entire logic, Hegel emphasized that the content cannot be separated from the form.
The general nature of form must not be simply the form in which the concept with its manifold provisions was the content of the logical sciences.
On the contrary, the general formality is rather one which befits all those forms, under which the unified concept allowed for the topic of logic. ((s) Form of thought: is befitting). This generality then applies to only one position outside the logic.
An overview of the whole becomes possible as soon as the absolute immanence is abandoned, and you know that nothing is left out._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992