Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
| |||
Consciousness, philosophy: consciousness ist the experience of differences along with a knowledge about alternatives as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also Intentionality, Identity theory, Other minds, Self-consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
---|---|---|---|
Güven Güzeldere on Consciousness - Dictionary of Arguments
Metz I, 403f The consciousness of mental states is perceived as "perception-like" by Locke, Armstrong, Churchland and Lycan. Whereas Rosenthal, Carruthers, Dennett and Descartes perceive it as "thought-like". >Mental states, >Internal states, >Thinking, >Thoughts, >Self-knowledge, cf. >Self-consciousness; >J. Locke, >D. Armstrong, >Paul Churchland, >Patricia Churchland, >W. Lycan, >D. Rosenthal, >D. Dennett, >R. Descartes._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Güzeldere I Güven Güzeldere "Is consciousness the perception of what passes in the mind?" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |