Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
Field II 380
Circumstances/Reliability/Relativization/Goldman/Fiel: (Goldman, 1980): one should not relativize to circumstances within a possible world when it comes to reliability: otherwise there would be no obstacle to narrowing the relativity to a single instance - then the rule would be in every single application reliable and thus also reasonable - Goldman: even the relativization to complete possible worlds is still too narrow, we must take classes of similar possible worlds as a basis.

Gold I
Alvin I. Goldman
Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays Oxford 2015

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

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> Counter arguments in relation to Reliability Theory

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25