|Signs: signs are recognizable and definable forms that an observer can assign to two domains. The first domain is the repertoire of available forms that allows a distinction of similarity and dissimilarity within this domain, the second domain is a set of objects which also distinguishes between similarity and dissimilarity between these objects as well as distinguishing the objects of the second domain from the forms of the first domain. There are no signs without observation or interpretation. See also language, words, symbols, icons, systems, image, image theory, pictures, assignment._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Signs/16. century/Foucault: The relation to the texts is of the same nature as that to the things, here and there signs are included.
God has littered nature with signs (figures to be deciphered) while the people of antiquity have already given interpretations. The legacy of antiquity is like nature itself, a broad space to be interpreted.
Divination and erudition are a similar hermeneutics.
The truth of the signs, whether on parchment or in nature, is the same, it is as archaic as the institution of God. Between the signs and the words, there is no distinction between the observation and the accepted authority or the verifiable and the tradition. There is everywhere only the same game of the sign and the like.
Signs/Foucault: Question: how connected with the designated: 17th century: how can a sign be connected with what it means, later, classical age: analysis of representation, modern: analysis of sense and meaning. But this is precisely why language will be nothing more but a special case of representation. The deep cohesion of language and the world is dissolved.
Sign/Foucault: On the threshold of the classical age, the sign ceases to be a form of the world, and it is no longer connected by the mysterious tapes of similarity.
Classic: defines the character according to 3 variables:
1. Origin of the connection (natural, e.g. as in mirror or conventional, which can be an idea for a group of people).
2. Type of connection: belonging to the whole as, for example, the healthy appearance.
3. the certainty of the connection: constant, that one is sure of its reliability,
E.g. like breathing for life. None of these links necessarily implies similarity.
E.g. screams are spontaneous signs of anxiety, but they are not analog to it.
Berkeley/Foucault: The visual sensations are signs of touch, which are established by God, yet they do not resemble it in any way.
These 3 variables occur in the place of similarity.
16th century: it was not necessary that signs were recognized, that did not alter their existence.
17th century: the whole area of the sign divides itself between the definite and the probable. There could be no more unknown sign, no more mute mark.
That is not that the people are in possession of all possible signs, but that a sign only exists from the moment when the possibility of a substitutive relation between two already known elements is recognized.
It is always formed only by an act of knowledge. Here the knowledge breaks its old relationship with the divinatio.
Sign/discourse: the discourse uses the signs for more than the name of the things. This more makes them irreducible to speech and language. This must be analyzed._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970
Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994
l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969
Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981