Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Qua objects, philosophy: qua objects are objects, explicitly referred to under a particular description, to extract one of several possible functions of this object. E.g. Reagan qua President in contrast to Reagan qua actor. This reduces the amount of possible conclusions resulting from the use of names for this object. In the technical sense, the use of Qua objects prevents an object from being counted multiple times. Problems arise with regard to which "address" e.g. a quote is to be attributed to. See also partition, attribution, individuation, identification, specification.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
Simons I 298
Qua-objects/Kit Fine/Simons: x qua F - or x under the description of F. Definition Basis: the underlying object - Definition Explanation/gloss: x qua F is always differentiated from the base - SimonsVsFine: this is too strong, because then one would also have to distinguish "x qua self-identity" from x - also essential properties should not make up the qua. - Only contingent properties are ment to occur in the explanation. - Simons: most qua-objects have incorporated their explanation, not as a property. - (This already exists in Principia Mathematica). - Qua-objects provide an ontological dependency for a conceptual dependency - e.g. fist qua clenched hand. - e.g. statue qua shaped clay - SimonsVs: they do not achieve anything, one cannot form with them new singular terms from old.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Fin I
K. Fine
The Limits of Abstraction Oxford 2008

FinA I
A. Fine
The Shaky Game (Science and Its Conceptual Foundations series) Chicago 1996

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

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> Counter arguments in relation to Qua-Objects

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-07-11
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