|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Nozick II 89
I/Fichte: the I sets itself as self-settling. - NozickVsFichte: can we conjure the rabbit from the rabbit? - But pro Fichte: otherwise we would have to assume a preexisting self and again ask for the origin.
Preexisting: if only the last momentary act of synthesis constitutes the self, but reverts to preexisting entities, they would be extinguished when looking into the past because the last act is the synthesis. - Then the preexisting things would not be the I.
Preexisting/Solution/Nozick: the person preexists - but not independent of the act of synthesis. Difference: person/self.
Bubner I 108
I/Fichte/Bubner: Action of the self-settling I._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992