|Deception, philosophy: A deception is an idea that diverges from what would have been expected by the way in which this idea was caused, when the expectation or expectability is based on past experience or shared experiences and expectations of a community of subjects. See also error, causal theory of knowledge, reliability theory, knowledge, certainty, objectivity, intersubjectivity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Deception/Feyerabend: For example, a moving pattern that has just come to a halt. Feyerabend: you see that it moves in the opposite direction, but without changing its position. The only phenomenologically correct description of this fact is "it moves in space, but it does not change its place" and this description is contradictory.
OwenVisFeyerabend: these are phenomena, not real events. FeyerabendVsOwen: that does not solve the difficulty. For if we introduce "seems", we have to put it at the beginning of the sentence: "it seems that to be moving without changing its place." ((s)> Sensory Impressions/Sellars, >Appearance/Sellars)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997
Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979