|Meaning change/semantic change: this is about the question whether the meaning of the terms of a theory change in the light of new knowledge. If they do, problems with incommensurability may arise. See also reference, incommensurability, progress, comparisons.|
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|Rorty I 293
Meaning Change/Feyerabend: Thesis: the traditional empirical position assumed a "postulate of the invariance of meaning". Feyerabend, like Th. Kuhn, wanted to show that the meaning and predictions change when a new theory arises.
Once conceptual schemata became transient, the distinction between schema and content itself was in danger, and thus the Kantian concept of philosophy as a discipline made possible by the a priori knowledge of our own contribution to science.
Meaning Change/Feyerabend: Changes in ontology are often accompanied by conceptual changes. (PutnamVs).
Feyerabend: E.g. classical physics: the properties are inherent in the objects.
Relativity Theory: Properties are only relations. These two systems do not have a single statement in common.
Theory/Popper/Lakatos/Feyerabend: are theories comparable? Feyerabend: No, they have no content classes common, in which the logical relations of inclusion, exclusion, or overlapping can be established.
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Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000