Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
Cresswell II 163
Knowledge/Dretske/Cresswell: (Dretske 1983) very strong thesis: what we know and are able to do, is limited by what we can differentiate. (Distinguishing ability limits possible knowledge).
Cresswell: but that is compatible with my theses.
Dretske: For example: Suppose, dolphins can recognize cylinders as shapes. By chance, they only saw plastic cylinders. Or perhaps all cylindrical objects are made of plastic coincidentally. This would not show that the dolphin has acquired the term "plastic".
Dretske: (p. 17): but this applies only to simple concepts, not to composite concepts.
Cresswell: that's surprising!

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Dret I
F. Dretske
Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-24