Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Fred Dretske on Beliefs - Dictionary of Arguments

Perler I 218
Belief/Animal/Plant/Surprise/Dretske: Plants can be "duped". Too early warm weather and drought make the inner clock run too fast. When behavior is produced by internal representations, we are tempted to use intentional vocabulary. The plant is "mistaken". We also do this with devices. The internal clock of these plants may mean that it is July (instead of April).
N.B.: but the fact that it means it, is irrelevant for the fact that the plant changes color.


Perler I Fred Dretske Minimale Rationalität in D.Perler/M. Wild (Hg.)Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt/M. 2005


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Dretske I
Fred Dretske
"Minimal Rationality", in: S. L. Hurley and M. Nudds (Eds.) Rational Animals?, Oxford 2005
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

Dretske II
F. Dretske
Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997

Perler I
Dominik Perler
Markus Wild
Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-02-27
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