Dictionary of Arguments

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Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
Cresswell II 134
Meaning/Preposition/Dretske/Hyperintensionality/Cresswell: also Dretske, (1972) looks at some (which he does not call "semantic prepositions"): e.g. "erroneously" in connection with different stresses.
Stress/Truths conditions/Dretske: although there is no difference in the truth conditions with different stresses on different sentence parts: E.g.

(4) Clyde gave me THE TICKETS.


(5) Clyde gave ME the tickets.

N.B.: with the preposition "erroneously" this changes: here there is a difference in meaning with differently stressed sentences. And thus a truth-conditional difference.

(6) Clyde mistakenly gave me THE TICKETS.

is wrong, however

(7) Clyde mistakenly gave ME the tickets.

is true.
Solution/Stechow: Distinguishing between object (topic) and focus (center point). The focus is what is involved in the difference.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Dretske I
Fred Dretske
"Minimal Rationality", in: S. L. Hurley and M. Nudds (Eds.) Rational Animals?, Oxford 2005
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

Dretske II
F. Dretske
Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-20
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