|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
R. Descartes on I, Ego, Self - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 76
Ego/Descartes/Anscombe: Descartes has asserted the non-identity of his self with a body.
This argument only works in the first person! Everyone has to proclaim it in the form of "I'm not a body". >First Person.
More precisely, Descartes should have said, "I am not Descartes." For the proper name Descartes denominates nothing but a person.
Frank I 84
Ego/Descartes/Anscombe: The Ego is not a kind of body. I might assume that I have no body. >Body, >person, >personal identity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994