|Knowledge: Knowledge is a conscious relationship to sentences or propositions, which legitimately attributes to them truth or falsehood. What is known is true. Conversely, it does not apply that everything that is true is also known. See also knowledge how, propositional knowledge, realism, abilities, competence, truth, facts, situations, language, certainty, beliefs, omniscience, logical knowledge, reliability_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Knowledge/Consciousness/color researcher Mary/Jackson/Nagel/Chalmers: (Jackson 1982(1), Nagel 1974(2)). E.g. Color researcher Mary knows everything there is to know about colors - but she has never seen colors.
All neurophysical knowledge cannot explain how it is to see red. The knowledge of how it is (experience) does not follow from physical knowledge alone.
Bat-Example/Nagel/Chalmers: boils down to the same: it remains an open question: it is compatible with all physical facts that bats or even mice have a consciousness, and it is also compatible with them that they have none.
Jackson/Chalmers: Jackson has presented his argument JacksonVsMaterialism, not VsReductionism, not against a reductive explanation of our conscious experience.
See also Lewis (1990), and Nemirov (1990).
Knowledge/intension/fact/Chalmers: every time, if one knows a fact under one way of giveness, but not under another, there will be an additional, different fact which one does not know. E.g. Morning star/Evening Star, Superman/Clark Kent, Water/H2O.
The new fact that one learns (also e.g. color researcher Mary, when she first sees a color) is a fact in relation to the way of giveness.
1. F. Jackson, Ephiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32, 1982: pp. 127-36
2. Th. Nagel What it is like to be a bat? Philosophical Review 4, 1974: pp. 435-50_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996
Constructing the World Oxford 2014