Books on Amazon:
Syntax/Semantics/Chinese Room/Searle/Chalmers: (Searle 1984): extended argument by Searle:
1. A computer program is syntactic
2. Syntax is not sufficient for semantics
3. Consciousnesses (mind) have semantics
4. Therefore, it is not sufficient to implement a program to maintain a consciousness (mind).
Chalmers: here it is again about intentionality (understanding), but the argument can be extended to consciousness, since Searle anyway is concerned with phenomenal intentionality.
Solution/Chalmers: it is not a question of isolated programs, but about their implementation, that is, about the program together with an environment, i.e. concrete systems with causal dynamics.
SearleVsVs: could argue that the implementations are again syntactic.
ChalmersVs: but in this sense "syntax" loses the meaning in which it is not sufficient for semantics. Then one could argue:
1. Recipes are syntactic
2. Syntax is not sufficient for crumbling
3. Cakes are crumbly
4. Therefore, following the steps in a recipe is not sufficient to bake a cake.
Solution: we need to distinguish between the recipe and its application as we differentiate between the program and its implementation.
Program/Chalmers: a program implicitly specifies a class of physical systems that can be used as implementations, and these systems are the systems that create such phenomena as consciousness.
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996
Constructing the World Oxford 2014