Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 22
Language/Qualia/Phenomenology/Psychology/Chalmers: we have no special language for phenomenal qualities. We must always describe them in terms of external properties, e.g. Colorful experiences.
Feeling language/Ryle: he was right: we have no "neat" words for feeling.
I 23
Sensation/Criterion/Wittgenstein: an inner process needs external criteria.
Chalmers: nevertheless, why should one not assume that ultimately only one property (be it phenomenal or psychological) is involved?
ChalmersVs: if a phenomenal property is specified by a psychological concept, it is not a psychological property - it is only a "property specified by a psychological concept".
Definition/specification/Chalmers: we must not say, the concept "conscious experience" was defined by the psychological property! The usually common occurrence of circumstances cannot be used for definition.

Cha I
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

> Counter arguments against Chalmers
> Counter arguments in relation to Language

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23