Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 327
Simulation/Artificial Intelligence/Consciousness/Searle/Chalmers: SearleVsArtificial Intelligence (Searle 1980), HarnadVsArtificial Intelligence (Harnad 1989): Thesis: the simulation of a phenomenon is not the same as a replica of the phenomenon. E.g. the digital simulation of the digestion process does not digest any food.
I 328
Simulation/Chalmers: while some simulations are not real doublings, e.g. the simulation of heat, others are real doublings: e.g. the simulation of a system with a causal loop is a system with a causal loop.
Definition Simulation/Chalmers: a simulation of X is an X if the property of being X is an organizational invariance. That is, if the system depends only on the functional organization of the underlying system and nothing else. The remaining properties are not retained. For example, the property of being a hurricane is not organisationally invariant because it is partly dependent on non-organizational properties such as speed, shape, etc. Likewise, heat or digestion depend on aspects of the physical nature and are not entirely organisational.
Consciousness/Simulation/Chalmers: phenomenal properties are different: they are organisationally invariant; i.e. in case of an identical physical structure, two systems will have the same phenomenal experiences. Thus, consciousness becomes one of the other different property.

Cha I
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25