Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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David Chalmers
I 173
Phenomenal Judgments/Chalmers: phenomenal judgments are the core of the relationships between cognition and consciousness. These are verbal expressions of assertions about consciousness.
I 174
Judgment/Chalmers: judgement can be taken as what I and my zombie twin have in common.
Semantic content/Chalmers: semantic content, on the other hand, is formed partly by conscious experiences themselves (e.g., beliefs about sensations of red). The judgments of the zombies have only the same form as my reports, they have no content.
I 175
I can only refer to the judgments of the zombies in a deflationist manner ((s) purely quoting).
Content/Chalmers: content can only be added by phenomenal beliefs, but it is unclear what role consciousness plays.
Phenomenal Judgments/Chalmers: 1. level: phenomenal judgements concern the objects of experience. This is about awareness.
I 176
2. level: Judgments on conscious experiences. E.g. I note that I have an experience of something red. Such judgments can also be about kinds of experiences.
3. Level: is about conscious experiences as a type of experience. E.g. about the fact that we have conscious experiences at all and how this can be explained.
I 177
Problem: Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, but judgments have to be explained like this because they are in the field of psychology.
Paradoxically, consciousness is ultimately irrelevant to the explanation of phenomenal judgments. (Avshalom Elitzur (1989), Roger Shepard (psychologist, 1993)

Cha I
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23