Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

 
Propositions, philosophy: propositions are defined as the meanings of sentences, whereby a sentence is interpreted as a character string, which must still be interpreted in relation to a situation or a speaker. E.g. “I am hungry” has a different meaning from the mouth of each new speaker. On the other hand, the sentence “I am hungry” from the mouth of the speaker, who first expressed the German sentence, has the same meaning as the German sentence uttered by him. See also meaning, propositional attitudes, identity conditions, opacity, utterances, sentences.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
Schwarz I 207 (Note)
Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.).
Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions.
Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a, 38, 1994b, 296f).
Newer Terminology:
Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1 Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions
Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2 Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions.
Definition A-Proposition/1 Proposition/C Proposition/2 Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a, 2004, Lewis 2002b, Chalmers 1996b, 5665)
Definition meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975,173): meaning 1 refers to secondary truth conditions
Definition meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning 2 is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension".
Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things:
Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions.
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Chalmers I 64
Propositions/Chalmers: there are primary and secondary propositions corresponding to the primary and secondary intensions shown here. (> Two-dimensional semantics,> Kaplan's distinction content/character).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


> Counter arguments against Chalmers
> Counter arguments in relation to Propositions

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-26