Dictionary of Arguments

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Phenomenology: is the philosophical direction, which goes back to E. Husserl and which assumes that the phenomena of the objects are what is given to us immediately. According to this assumption, these phenomena are the only evident things to us. See also representation, phenomena, perception, certainty, evidence.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 305
Phenomenology/Chalmers: if it is true that every time a mass or charge is realized, based on a micro-phenomenal property (> Ontology/Chalmers), then the question remains of the relationship between the micro- and macro-level, the level of the ((s) of human) consciousness.
I 306
Problem/Chalmers: our conscious experiences are too holistic to be the sum of micro-states in the information space. This is the problem of the ratio of fine-grained to coarse-grained events (Sellars, 1965)(1).
Problem: how can our experiences be so supple if they consist of building blocks of this kind? We leave the problem open.

1. W. Sellars, The identity apporoach to the mind.-body problem. Review of Metaphysics 18, 1965: pp. 430-51

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-20
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