Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Intrinsic: Intrinsic are properties which are not caused by relationships to other objects, e.g. to have a certain age. Intrinsic properties are not to be confused with essential properties, e.g. a certain age is usually not essential for an object. Extrinsic properties are, e.g. to be famous, that is to say, properties which arise from the fact that there are other objects, and these other objects have a relation to the object in question._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Chalmers on Intrinsicness - Dictionary of Arguments
Schwarz I 226 Intrinsic properties/Nature/Panpsychism/Panprotopsychism/Chalmers/Schwarz: Chalmers (Chalmers 2002)(1)takes advantage of this gap: starting point is a kind. Def Quidditism: Thesis: Our physical theories describe how physical things and properties behave with each other, what they are, but leave their intrinsic nature in the dark. >Properties, >Laws of nature, >Naturalism, >Physics, >Explanation. Def Pan(proto)psychism: thesis: this intrinsic nature of things and qualities is mental. For example, what we know, from the outside as charge -1, turns out to be a pain from within. ((s) See also > two aspects theory, >Panpsychism. If our physical vocabulary is rigid (i.e., always refers, in the domain of modal operators, to what plays the causal structural role in us, that is to say pain), then the physical truths necessarily imply the mental, but the implication does not need to be a priori. >Rigidity, >Reference. Problem: The physical truths are not sufficient to tell us exactly what situation we are in, especially in regard to the intrinsic nature of the physical quantities. Cf. >Possible Worlds, >Twin Earth. 1. D. Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (Hg.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Chalmers
> Counter arguments in relation to Intrinsicness
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16