Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Intensions: intensions are reference objects resulting from a linguistic description, in contrast to the material objects (extensions) that may differ therefrom, whether due to inaccuracies, or by the use of indexical expressions. Examples of intensions are “the oldest person in the room”, “the winner”, “John's favorite quote”, “the one who violates the speed limit”. See also morning star/evening star, extensionality, extension.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 54
Intension/Chalmers: intension is a function that defines how a concept is used in different situations. It is not the same as "meaning" and also not a definition.
I 57
Intension/Chalmers: depending on whether a concept picks out an object in the actual world, or in a counterfactual world, I will speak of primary and secondary intension.
Secondary Intension/Chalmers: secondary intension is therefore, independent of empirical factors. It describes how reference depends on how the outer world turns out. (> twin earth,> rigidity).
I 61
When counterfactual worlds are involved, it is not a priori determined what the reference is, since the actual world can be determined by different speakers as their own (mirror-inverted). (> Centered Worlds, Quine) The determination as a primary or secondary intension will then also vary inversely.
I 62
Meaning/Chalmers: Both primary as well as secondary intensions are candidates for the "meaning" of a concept. "Water" could mean H2O, or twin earth water, depending on what is meant by the concept in the respective world.
I 63
Necessary Truth/Chalmers: both can even be constructed as a necessary truth when possible worlds are conceived as uttering contexts.
I 200
Primary Intension/Chalmers: For example, the largest star in the universe: picks out a star in every given centered world. Even non-existent objects have a primary intension, e.g. the Nicholas, (Santa Claus). This primary intension could have picked out an object if the world had turned out accordingly.
For my concept of consciousness, the primary intension is more important than a causal relation to an object.
I 205
Also, a zombie can have primary intensions that are overlapping with mine.
I 206
Quality/Qualia: primary intensions do not specify Qualia.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Cha I
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

> Counter arguments against Chalmers
> Counter arguments in relation to Intensions

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-23