|Content: content is that part of a statement, what can be represented by another statement, which differs in a respect from the original statement, e.g. it uses other expressions with the same reference. That, in which the second statement deviates belongs then to the vocabulary, to the syntax or grammar, the matching can be called content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Books on Amazon:
1. What do our concepts like "consciousness" or "red experience" actually pick out (in a given world)?
2. What constitutes the content of these concepts, is it determined by the psychological nature alone, or also by the phenomenal?
Zombie: could it have the same intensions of beliefs as I do? If it is subject to a conceptual confusion, that might be the same for me. The zombie could not make true or false judgments about consciousness in itself, but also in relation to me! For it could not use the term properly. But the concept of consciousness differs from the concept of "water" insofar as the "acquaintance" with the object is much more direct in the case of consciousness.
Experience: is there a public language usage, e.g. for the term "red experience"?
Problem: Inverted spectra. Solution: Standard conditions for standard observers. Moreover, we do not want to limit the term to my personal experiences, but look at every one's experiences.
Qualia: secondary intensions are not enough. We also learn something when we learn how it is to experience something red: the experience of something red could have been different, but it is so. In this way, we limit the scope of possibilities. For this, however, we need different primary intensions.
Communication/Qualia: Only if others can have such experiences (under relevant causal conditions), my Qualia are communicable.
Content/Consciousness/Conclusion/Chalmers: Beliefs about experiences are central. And these cannot be the same with my zombie twin as with me. But we do not need a causal theory of knowledge. We can even refer to experiences by assuming a property dualism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996
Constructing the World Oxford 2014