Physical Laws/Causes/Supervenience/Reduction/Chalmers: Natural laws are not logically supervenient on the physical facts of our world with their spatio-temporal history. There could be another world, indistinguishable from our world, on which other physical laws apply.
Regularity/Chalmers: on such arguments one can see that causality must be a bit above and independent of regularities (Hume's view of laws and causation: see Lewis 1986b, Mackie 1974, Skyrms 1980. VsHueme's view: Armstrong 1982, Carroll 1994, Dretske 1977, Molnar 1969, Tooley 1977)) .. Laws and causality have something irreducible.
Laws/Consciousness/Chalmers: we will need psychophysical laws to explain consciousness together with a underlying physical structure.
Data: we have at least data about regularities between physical processes and conscious experiences, from which we can conclude the best explanation.
First Person/Chalmers: Problem: with the perspective of the first person, a number of contradictory theories are possible: e.g. Solipsism, panpsychism, etc.
Laws/psychophysical laws/Chalmers: some questions need to be answered:
1. If the information space is phenomenologically realized, then why in one way and not in another? E.g. With inverted Qualia?
2. Is the nature of the phenomenal information defined by the structure of space?
How can complex emotional experiences be explained?
4. What kind of formal structure best captures the structure of phenomenal information?
5. How can the unity of consciousness within our framework be captured?
6. What are the criteria according to which information in my brain corresponds to my conscious experiences?_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996
Constructing the World Oxford 2014